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ABSTRACT
For years Delta, American, and United airlines have cited unfair practices by Qatar,
United Arab Emirates, and Etihad airways. The main problem, they argued, was the unfair
business practices, especially the government subsidies provided to these Gulf carriers that they
believed harmed competition, and put at risk millions of U.S. jobs supported by tourism and
travel (Al-Sayeh, 2014). Delta, American, and United airlines believed that the Gulf carriers
were in direct violation of their Open Skies agreement, which provides open competition
between all airlines. “Fair and open” eliminates government interference in commercial
decisions of air carriers about routes, capacity, and pricing (Open and Fair Skies, 2019). If the
Open Skies agreement was abandoned by the Gulf countries, many American jobs would be in
jeopardy because of route closures that Delta, American, and United airlines would have to part
in. In May 2018 the Trump administration came to an agreement with Qatar and United Arab
Emirates that purports to protect American jobs and U.S. trade deals against unfair foreign
practices (Holland, 2019). This agreement came to fruition because of the constant plea of Delta,
American, and United airlines for many years that something must be done in order to protect
U.S. job security in the commercial aviation business.
Through comparative statistical analysis, this study reveals the correlation between
international travel on U.S. routes and how tourism provided on those routes relates directly to
American jobs. It explains how international visitors contributed to U.S. jobs through their travel
and why it is vital for the Open Skies Agreement to be followed.
x

The study examines the Delta, American, and United airlines unfair practices claims, and
the resulting U.S. government’s Open Skies Agreement that was implemented. The researcher
investigates data variables collected from the U.S. International Air Passenger and Freight
Statistics Report for the 2014-2016 years (transportation.gov, 2018), including passenger travel
for Delta, American, and United airlines’ U.S. international routes. The data was compared to
research collected from the four busiest European airports to explain how international visitors
contributed to U.S. jobs through their travel and why it is vital for the Open Skies Agreement to
be followed.

xi

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Open Skies agreements were established to expand international passenger and cargo
flights to and from the United States, promote increased travel and trade, enhance productivity,
and spur high-quality job opportunities and economic growth (Open and Fair Skies, 2019). Open
Skies agreements do not limit international travel routes regarding types of aircraft used, amount
of time the route is flown, or the number of people onboard the aircraft—the reason being that
fair and open competition determines the pricing for those routes. “Fair and open” eliminates
government interference in commercial decisions of air carriers about routes, capacity, and
pricing (Open and Fair Skies, 2019). This usually ends up benefitting the consumer because with
fair competition airlines’ typically lower prices to compete and usually offer better travel options
for the consumer.
There have been many major airline regulation changes internationally over the past 30
years, with many Open Skies Agreements included in those changes. In 1992, the Netherlands—
albeit with displeasure from the other European Union (EU) countries—was the first nation to
sign an Open Skies Agreement with the United States, granting both countries with unrestricted
privileges to land on each other’s soil. In 2007 possibly the most significant open skies air
transport agreement took place between the EU and the U.S. The U.S.-EU Air Transport
Agreement, allowed United States airlines, access to the European community and its twentyseven member states. U.S. airlines were allowed to fly between two points in the EU as long as it
1

was a continuation flight from the United States (Open and Fair Skies, 2019). It created vastly
more business for any U.S. carrier that flew into the EU. For a long time before the agreements
the airline industry favored nationalism, and in most cases favored known airlines with their
specific routes.
The first open-skies agreements between the United States and the U.A.E. and Qatar were
signed in 1999 and respectively 2002. Once again, to promote fair competition in an aviation
market free from government interference to reduce high prices for consumers.
However, in January 2015 Delta Air Lines, American Airlines, and United Airlines raised
concerns and released joint findings regarding the Gulf carriers of Qatar Airways, Etihad
Airways, and Emirates Airlines. They claimed the Gulf carriers were deliberately going against
the Open Skies agreements that were established with the nations of Qatar and the United Arab
Emirates (UAE) (See Figures 1, 2, 3). Specifically pointing to Article 11 which deals with Fair
Competition, and Article 12 which deals with Pricing (Articles are defined in Chapter II). The
U.S. carriers claimed that those Gulf carriers received unfair subsidies from their governments in
upwards of $52 billion (Burnley, 2017).
The U.S. carriers argue that these subsidies received by Qatar and the UAE were
purposely distorting the international aviation market, thus creating unfair competition for the
U.S.-based carriers according to Delta Air Lines, American Airlines, and United Airlines.
Subsidized support from the Gulf governments included interest-free loans with no obligation to
repay (Al-Sayeh, 2014). They also received exemptions from airport fees, free land, and
government grants and monetary injections when needed. The subsidization that those countries
gained for their airlines directly impacted the international market flow in terms of Delta Air
Lines, American Airlines, and United Airlines being able to fairly compete.
2

Figure 1. Qatar Airways Benefits. This figure illustrates the value of subsidies to Qatar Airways
from the Qatar government (Open and Fair Skies, 2019).
Free and open competition and a level playing field usually allows the U.S. airline
industry to be competitive. A strong U.S. airline industry typically reflects a thriving and strong
U.S. economy. The unfair practices used by Qatar, Etihad, and Emirates not only threatened the
United States airline industry, but directly threatened more than 10 million jobs and $1.5 trillion
in economic activity that the U.S. airlines, especially the big three airlines—American, Delta,
and United—support daily (Economic Growth, 2017).

3

Figure 2. Etihad Airways Benefits. This figure illustrates the value of subsidies to Etihad
Airways from the Abu Dhabi government (Open and Fair Skies, 2019).

Gulf carriers, and those who have supported them, typically cite that these carriers are
bringing new traffic and tourism into the United States. However, after reviewing the passenger
data for the past five years, it is apparent that there is no truth to that argument. The “new traffic”
has not stimulated any growth for the U.S. economy. While these Gulf carriers have enjoyed
“new traffic” on their carriers because of subsidization from the United States and other
countries, this has come at the expense of U.S. carriers (Open and Fair Skies, 2019).

4

Figure 3. Emirates Airways Benefits. This figure illustrates the value of subsidies to Emirates
Airways from the Dubai government (Open and Fair Skies, 2019).
In January and May 2018, the Trump Administration came to an agreement with both the
Qatar and the UAE to end government subsidies and make changes on how they do their
financials in order to protect American jobs and airlines. The changes included assurance that
Qatar and the UAE deliver on their promises that they pledged to the U.S. government (Open
and Fair Skies, 2019).
Purpose of Study
The purpose of this study was to research the benefit of having open and fair skies
through the eyes of the U.S. carriers. The study will explore the history of Open Skies
agreements, the advantages that Qatar and the UAE received, and the claims that the United
5

States carriers had subsidies of their own. The investigation looked at the economic impact of
Open Skies agreements and what those mean for U.S. carriers and jobs.
The importance of this study is to show how beneficial it is to have open and fair
competition. In fair practice open skies agreements with competition should provide consumer
benefits, and a positive correlation to the U.S. economy through jobs. Open Skies agreements
have greatly benefited U.S. carriers and economy through jobs, and it is important to realize that
impact when countries take advantage of agreements that are in place. The research on Open
Skies agreements can show the impact on U.S. jobs as well as on U.S. carriers, but it can also
show the benefit for all airlines to act in a fair and competitive market when it comes to
agreements for open skies.
Research Questions
The research was guided by the following questions:
1. Do Open Skies agreements have a positive impact to U.S. jobs?
2. Do Open Skies agreements provide consumer benefits?
3. How were the countries of Qatar and the UAE hurting U.S. carriers, i.e. jeopardizing U. S.

jobs?

6

CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
The United States started to pursue Open Skies agreements in the late 1970s, and by the
early 1980s had signed 23 bilateral agreements with nations around the world (Meyer, 2002).
However, the history behind the founding of Open Skies agreements goes back to the 1940s.
History of Open Skies Agreements
Towards the end of World War II, the United States started to look at aviation and the use
of airplanes for commercial passenger air travel. In 1944 the first steps of civil transport and
growth came at the Convention on International Civil Aviation, which occurred in Chicago
(Aviation Support, 2019). Fifty-two countries signed the “Chicago Convention” and through this
the freedoms of the air were established and accepted by the Provisional International Civil
Aviation Organization (PICAO) in 1945. The International Civil Aviation Organization, or
ICAO, took over PICAO in April 1947 (Aviation Support, 2019). According to the Manual on
the Regulation of International Air Transport (2004), the following nine freedoms of the air were
established:
First Freedom of the Air - the right or privilege, in respect of scheduled international air
services, granted by one State to another State or States to fly across its territory without landing
(also known as a First Freedom Right).
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Second Freedom of the Air - the right or privilege, in respect of scheduled international
air services, granted by one State to another State or States to land in its territory for non-traffic
purposes (also known as a Second Freedom Right).
Third Freedom of The Air - the right or privilege, in respect of scheduled international air
services, granted by one State to another State to put down, in the territory of the first State,
traffic coming from the home State of the carrier (also known as a Third Freedom Right)
Fourth Freedom of The Air - the right or privilege, in respect of scheduled international
air services, granted by one State to another State to take on, in the territory of the first State,
traffic destined for the home State of the carrier (also known as a Fourth Freedom Right).
Fifth Freedom of The Air - the right or privilege, in respect of scheduled international air
services, granted by one State to another State to put down and to take on, in the territory of the
first State, traffic coming from or destined to a third State (also known as a Fifth Freedom
Right).
ICAO characterizes all “freedoms” beyond the Fifth as “so-called” because only the first
five “freedoms” have been officially recognized as such by international treaty (Aviation
Support, 2019).
Sixth Freedom of The Air - the right or privilege, in respect of scheduled international air
services, of transporting, via the home State of the carrier, traffic moving between two other
States (also known as a Sixth Freedom Right). The so-called Sixth Freedom of the Air, unlike the
first five freedoms, is not incorporated as such into any widely recognized air service agreements
such as the “Five Freedoms Agreement” (also referred to as the International Air Transport
Agreement, which is the first five freedoms).
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Seventh Freedom of The Air - the right or privilege, in respect of scheduled international
air services, granted by one State to another State, of transporting traffic between the territory of
the granting State and any third State with no requirement to include on such operation any point
in the territory of the recipient State, i.e. the service need not connect to or be an extension of any
service to/from the home State of the carrier.
Eighth Freedom of The Air - the right or privilege, in respect of scheduled international
air services, of transporting cabotage traffic between two points in the territory of the granting
State on a service which originates or terminates in the home country of the foreign carrier or (in
connection with the so-called Seventh Freedom of the Air) outside the territory of the granting
State (also known as an Eighth Freedom Right or “consecutive cabotage”).
Ninth Freedom of The Air - the right or privilege of transporting cabotage traffic of the
granting State on a service performed entirely within the territory of the granting State (also
known as a Ninth Freedom Right or “stand alone” cabotage).
The United States pursued Open Skies agreements as early as 1979 and by 1982 the
United States was in agreements with 23 countries making 23 Open Skies agreements, albeit
with smaller nations (Treaty on Open Skies, 2019). As mentioned earlier, one of the most
substantial agreements that came into place in April 2007, was EU-U.S. Open Skies Agreement
(Treaty on Open Skies, 2019).
In the EU-U.S. Open Skies agreement the European Union is not treated as a single
territory, so as long as the U.S. carrier has a continuation flight that was started in the U.S., then
it can fly between any two points in the EU. Some European airlines in the EU were
disappointed with this agreement because it superseded all other agreements that were in place
(Air Transport Action Group, 2005). The agreement grants U.S. carriers the ability to operate
9

intra-EU flights, while not allowing any European airlines to operate intra-U.S. flights. In
addition, European airlines are not allowed to have a controlling stake in a U.S. operator under
this agreement (Open and Fair Skies, 2019).
The U.S. also signed the Multilateral Agreement on the Liberalization of International
Air Transportation (MALIAT) in 2001 (Open and Fair Skies, 2019). This agreement with Chile,
New Zealand, Singapore, and Brunei was mediated by the European Commission and eventually
led to an agreement established in March 2007 (Open and Fair Skies, 2019). The U.S. also has
the ASEAN Multilateral Agreement on the Full Liberalization of Air Freight Services and
ASEAN Multilateral Agreement on Air Services with the 10-member Association of Southeast
Asian Nations that was approved in the spring of 2009 (Open and Fair Skies, 2019). The ASEAN
Open Sky Agreement is Southeast Asia’s founding and main policy when it comes to aviation.
The point of the agreement is to unify the Asian market into a single one for the future of
aviation in the area.
Open Skies Agreements: Open and Fair?
The point of open skies agreements is fair and open competition in international air
services. Fair being a key word, since this ends up being the concern for most airlines or
countries. “The open-skies concept was pursued by the United States to liberalize the
international air transport services with the aims of opening up the international aviation market
to all non-government related agencies. This is based on the free market system (Law C, 2017).”
Under a free market system, prices and goods are determined by the open market and
consumer, therefore supply and demand and laws that prevent government intervention cannot
set the price for air travel. This should set the table for consumers to receive a greater choice of
who to fly and benefit from lower airfare. This should imply open and fair competition in terms
10

of what open-skies agreements were founded on. The issue that usually have airlines or countries
pointing fingers at one another comes from the topic of a subsidy, which was not explicitly
addressed by open-skies agreement, only the World Trade Organization.
Subsidies: Background
With open skies agreements the activities associated with airlines become an important
role in a nation’s income, especially the United States. It not only increases trade activities, but
also helps tourism and job growth. A government will then begin to offer subsidies both directly
and indirectly to airlines to guarantee productivity and economic growth.
The definition of a subsidy is “a sum of money granted by the government or a public
body to assist an industry or business so that the price of a commodity or service may remain low
or competitive (Oxford Dictionary, 2020).” To a certain extent, the author believes that all
countries have received funding from their respective governments in order to secure
sustainability. The following paragraphs describe some of the subsidies that are offered in the
United States and throughout the world, and arguments against claims other countries have said
that the United States have took advantage of.
The Essential Air Service (EAS) is a program that was implemented by the U.S.
government to support small communities. The reason for this program is to maintain a level of
scheduled airline service to these communities that is not profitable. To continue service to these
communities that are not profitable the federal government has offered subsidies to cover
airlines’ losses on these routes (Law C, 2017).
Tourism subsidies, some airlines offer subsidies to airlines to help promote tourism
within the nation. For example, Turkish government increased a subsidy that it pays its operators
to bring foreign tourists into cities throughout the country. The government has offered a 30
11

percent increase for charter flights that carry a certain amount of passengers during their peak
holiday seasons (Ersen H, Sheahan M, 2016).
Subsidized airport charges are also utilized by many nations. In 2016, Ryanair carried
more international passengers than any other European airline. To attract the airline many
European airports offered concessionaires to Ryanair to persuade them to establish routes to
various local airports. The concessionaires had many things including waived landing fees, and
free check-in desks (Law C, 2017).
Fuel subsidies can also be utilized. The state of North Carolina offered a tax fuel
exemption on aviation fuel for commercial aircraft to encourage the frequency of flights into and
out of the state (North Carolina Department of Revenue, 2016).
Some countries have argued that the United States carriers received unsubstantial
government subsidies in the past. One of the main points those countries make is that U.S.
airlines received a subsidy following the 9/11 attacks. Although this may have appeared like a
subsidy, it was, in fact, reimbursements to those U.S. airlines for the losses that occurred after
the 9/11 attacks because the government mandated that all U.S. airspace be shut down after it
was found that airplanes were used as terror weapons (Open and Fair Skies, 2019).
Another argument that was frequently used is that most, if not all, U.S.-based airlines at
some point have used bankruptcy laws in order to get around creditors and decrease costs.
However, bankruptcy filings and proceedings are not government subsidies. They do not use any
taxpayer funds and are overseen by an independent judiciary. Under the international trade law,
they are not seen as government subsidies and are a pretty common practice that is used by legal
authorities throughout the world (Nunes, 2018). Under this same realm, claims that the anti-trust
immunity was granted to U.S. airlines to form global alliances is a type of government support
12

that is a subsidy. However, an anti-trust immunity is not a government subsidy. The point of an
anti-trust immunity is to allow U.S. airlines or carriers to work more efficiently with foreign
airlines or carriers to provide better service to customers across the board (Nunes, 2018).
Finally, probably one of the more well-known claims that still floats around is that the
Fly America Act is a subsidy for U.S. airlines. However, the Fly America Act merely requires
that all U.S. government-funded air travel be booked, whenever possible, with U.S. airlines, with
foreign airlines that code share with U.S. airlines, or with foreign airlines from countries that the
U.S. has an agreement with regarding government-procured transportation. Because the Fly
America program requires U.S. airlines to competitively bid for traffic, the result is that the U.S.
government pays ticket prices that are below commercial rates, which is the opposite of a
subsidy. In addition, the Gulf carriers participate in the program by carrying Fly America traffic
through codeshare partners (Nunes, 2018).
Open Skies: Jobs and Tourism
According to the World Travel and Tourism Council, international travel and tourism
generated a total contribution of $1.509 billion to the United States’ gross domestic product
(GDP) in 2016 (wttc.org, 2019). The total GDP impact of travel and tourism is larger than that of
agriculture, mining, and automotive manufacturing sectors. In terms of its direct GDP impact,
travel and tourism is more than three times the size of the agriculture industry in the United
States (wttc.org, 2019). According to the International Air Transport Association (iata.org,
2019), the travel and tourism sector supports nearly 10 percent of overall jobs in the United
States (iata.org, 2019). This is a significant number of jobs that the United States depends on the
airline industry for. It is especially important for the economy to take advantage of spending
brought by tourism in order to further grow and be prosperous. Threats to declining tourism by
13

international travel, not only hurts the airline industry, but it also hurts the direct and indirect
jobs that travel and tourism support on a daily basis. Direct jobs ranging from hotel managers,
tour guides, and restaurant business, and indirect jobs ranging from cleaning staff, maintenance
work etc.
A Cause for Concern
Fair competition has always been the major goal of the competitive airline industry. Delta
Air Lines, American Airlines, and United Airlines have competed with the emerging Gulf
carriers in the Middle East and for the most part have accepted the fact that those carriers would
be the primary providers of service in the region and to places like Europe or the United States.
As of this writing, those Gulf carriers have most of the market share (Open and Fair Skies,
2019).
These U.S. carriers are not opposed to the competition that the Gulf carriers bring to the
United States from the Middle East. Delta Air Lines, American Airlines, and United Airlines all
understand that this is part of a competitive market (Open and Fair Skies, 2019). The U.S.
airlines were not concerned about the Gulf carriers flying the domestic routes in the United
States because the Gulf carriers lack of Eighth Freedom rights preclude this from happening in
the United States. Qatar, Etihad, and Emirates airlines are configured for long-haul international
flying only (Rowell, 2002). It is the researcher’s opinion that U.S. carriers were concerned about
protecting their valuable international flights in to and out of the U.S from other regions around
the world.
The expansion of the Gulf airlines into U.S. cities directly from their respective countries
is hardly new, and overall it was met with little opposition from Delta Air Lines, American
Airlines, and United Airlines. The concern rose in 2013 when Emirates Airlines began operating
14

flights between Milan, Italy to New York’s Kennedy International Airport, showing that
Emirates was expanding outside the carrier’s home market (Zhang, 2015).
U.S. carriers lost their share of bookings from New York to Milan since Emirates began
operating the service between the two cities in 2013 (Zhang, 2015). Emirate’s share jumped 19
percent during this time, while the U.S. airlines’ share fell to 78 percent from the 85 percent they
held in the previous years (Dastin, 2015).
This, and primarily this, changed the entire way of thinking for the big three U.S. airlines.
Not only did it represent a conflict, but the U.S. carriers realized that any flight from the Middle
East that stopped in a European city, would then allow the Middle East carriers to be able to sell
tickets on the portion of the trip between the United States and Europe (Zhang, S., Derudder, B.,
& Witlox, F. ,2015). This is known as Fifth freedom flying—the right to carry passengers from
one’s own country to a second country, and from that country onward to a third country. Fifth
freedom rights are intended to enhance the economic viability of an airline’s long haul routes,
but are viewed to be unfair by the U.S. and other carriers (Rowell, 2002).
Transatlantic routes are the most profitable and competitive in the world, and while an
increase in competition is welcomed, it also has to be fair. The three Gulf carriers that were
already highly accomplished, and also had their respective governments provide finances for
their operations, provided a reality check that could have been cataclysmic to the U.S. carriers
and their codeshare partners overseas.
The Qatar and UAE Advantage
When Qatar and the UAE signed their respective Open Skies agreements with the United
States in 1999, they were to abide by the articles that were agreed upon. Government subsidies
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was something that was not in the agreement (Holland, 2019). To further understand this the
World Trade Organization outlined the definitions for a subsidy:
•

A government practice that involves a direct transfer of funds (e.g. grants, loans, and
equity fusion), potential direct transfer of funds or liabilities (e.g. loan guarantees)

•

Government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected

•

Government provides goods or services other than general infrastructure, or
purchases goods

•

Government makes payments to a funding mechanism, or entrusts, or directs a private
body to carry out one or more of the type of functions in (i) to (iii) above which
would normally be vested in government and the practice, in no real sense, differs
from practices normally followed by governments (Open and Fair Skies, 2019).

Since the World Trade Organization agrees on what the definition of a subsidy is,
anything not mentioned in their definition is not a subsidy.
Several nations determined that there were subsidies occurring in Qatar and the United
Arab Emirates based off of WTO definitions (Clampet, 2015). These claims stated that Emirates
received $2.4 billion from the UAE government in assumption of fuel hedging losses, $2.3
billion from government subsidized airport infrastructure, and more than $2.2 billion in “related
party transactions” with other UAE-owned companies in 2013-2014 alone (Law C, 2017) It is
known that there were tens of billions of dollars in airport construction by the UAE government,
providing unwavering support and growth for Emirates and Emirates alone. It is also known that
government assumption of Emirates fuel hedging contacts prevented the airline from billions of
dollars in losses during the 2009 market crash (Open and Fair Skies, 2019). They also claimed
Etihad had also received more than $4.6 billion zero interest loans from the UAE government,
16

taxes and duties are waved by the UAE and passenger fees at the government airport are covered
by the UAE (Law C, 2017). Several nations also stated that Qatar Airways had $8.4 billion in
loans and shareholder advances with no repayment obligations, $6.8 billion in reduced interest
payments from government loan guarantees, and $616 million in airport exemptions and rebates,
and $452 million in free land from the government of Qatar (Flottau J, 2015).
Once again, the Open Skies agreement does not specifically state that government
subsidies are not allowed. Definition of a subsidy falls under the World Trade Organization, and
it is assumed that the agreement will adhere to free and open competition on a level playing field.
Delta Air Lines, American Airlines, and United Airlines point to the articles in the Open Skies
agreement with Qatar and the UAE. One of the articles, Article 11, deals with fair competition
and states the following:
•

Each Party shall allow a fair and equal opportunity for the airlines of both Parties to
compete in providing the international air transportation governed by this Agreement.

•

Each Party shall allow each airline to determine the frequency and capacity of the
international air transportation it offers based upon commercial considerations in the
marketplace. Consistent with this right, neither Party shall unilaterally limit the
volume of traffic, frequency, or regularity of service, or the aircraft type or types
operated by the airlines of the other Party, except as may be required for customs,
technical, operational, or environmental reasons under uniform conditions consistent
with Article 15 of the Convention.

•

Neither Party shall impose on the other Party's airlines a first-refusal requirement,
uplift ratio, no-objection fee, or any other requirement with respect to capacity,
frequency, or traffic that would be inconsistent with the purposes of this Agreement.
17

•

Neither Party shall require the filing of schedules, programs for charter flights, or
operational plans by airlines of the other Party for approval, except as may be
required on a non-discriminatory basis to enforce the uniform conditions foreseen by
paragraph 2 of this Article or as may be specifically authorized in this Agreement. If a
Party requires filings for information purposes, it shall minimize the administrative
burdens of filing requirements and procedures on air transportation intermediaries and
on airlines of the other Party. (Aviation Support, 2019)

The second article, Article 12, deals with the pricing determination and states:
•

Each Party shall allow prices for air transportation to be established by airlines of
both Parties based upon commercial considerations in the marketplace.

•

Prices for international air transportation between the territories of the Parties shall
not be required to be filed. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the airlines of the Parties
shall provide immediate access, on request, to information on historical, existing, and
proposed prices to the aeronautical authorities of the Parties in a manner and format
acceptable to those aeronautical authorities (Aviation Support, 2019).

The claims against Qatar, Etihad, and Emirates by several nations along with Delta Air
Lines, American Airlines, and United Airlines state that these Gulf carriers are directly in
violation of Article 11 and Article 12. The subsidies that were received by the aforementioned
Gulf carriers were then allowed to buy large, wide-body aircraft and flood many routes with
excess capacity (Dresner, M., Eroglu, C., Hofer, C., Mendez, F., & Tan, K , 2015). Delta Air
Lines, American Airlines, and United Airlines claimed that this allowed the Gulf carriers to
lower prices on select routes. This concept is known as seat dumping, which means that excess
capacity flights with lower fares is artificial (See Figure 4).
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Figure 4. International Capacity. This figure illustrates the rise of international capacity and rank
of Qatar, Etihad, and Emirates Airways from 1998-2014 (Open and Fair Skies, 2019).
Economic Insight - A Brief Look
The government subsidies that were used and utilized by the Middle East carriers had a
direct effect on U.S. carriers, and U.S. jobs. Data retrieved from 2008-2016 passenger
information showed that almost 19,000 seats per day (or a 23 percent increase per year on
average) were added between the U.S. and Dubai, Doha, and Abu Dhabi during this time (See
Figure 5). This also reflected more than a 100 percent increase in seats from the Gulf carriers
because U.S. carriers no longer served those countries in the Middle East (Open and Fair Skies,
2019). Not only was there no attributed growth because of the traffic the Gulf carriers were
providing, but the Gulf carriers were reducing the number of passengers on U.S. airlines between
the United States and international city pairs by 8 percent (Open and Fair Skies, 2019). During
the years 2008 to 2014, there was an increase of more than 5,000 seats per day that happened
between Dubai and the nine U.S. cities that it was flying into. However, the daily bookings
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between all passengers on these routes and across all the airlines remained flat (Open and Fair
Skies, 2019).

Figure 5. Average Daily Roundtrip Flights. This figure illustrates the number of daily roundtrips
of UAE and Qatar in comparison to U.S. flights in April 2015 (Open and Fair Skies, 2019).
The main problem with the Gulf carriers not adding any significant travel on these
international routes is that a substantial loss occurred for U.S. carriers. The ratio of weekly
flights between Gulf carriers and U.S. carriers in the Middle East-US market as of June 2017 was
204:0. No additional traffic meant there was no additional tourism. No additional tourism meant
this would affect domestic routes within the United States. Domestic passenger travel has an 84
percent direct relation to spending in the U.S., and with routes that are harmed and/or reduced
because of Gulf carrier subsidies being used, a long-term implication to the economy occurs
(Open and Fair Skies, 2019). The aviation industry and academia in the United States are
worried that continual diminishing of passenger loads could lead to U.S. carriers reducing flight
20

frequencies of international flights, and thus having a spillover effect on domestic services (Law
C, 2017). In the United States most of the flag carriers still operate using a hub-and-spoke
network, which means transferring passengers from international flights to domestic flights and
vice versa. Delta Air Lines, American Airlines, and United Airlines are worried that they will
have to reduce international flight frequencies, which in turn reduces the demand for domestic
services as well because the Gulf carriers are being able to operate with a seemingly endless
amount of backing through subsidies by their respective governments.
In the author’s opinion the Gulf carriers clearly were taking a significant market share
from the U.S. carriers, and all the while hurting fair competition amongst those that abided to
agreements in the airline industry (Open and Fair Skies, 2019). The author also believes that the
Gulf carriers were not creating any increase in travel or demand for travel, which in turn would
be the only way that the U.S. would benefit in economy and jobs. The Gulf carriers basically
were shifting jobs and revenue from the U.S. carriers to the Gulf carriers without any penalty.
The argument has also been made by the Gulf carriers that abiding to the agreement that
was in place when the agreement was signed hurt consumer flexibility and increased prices
overall (Open and Fair Skies, 2019). Once again Open Skies agreements are in place to promote
open competition and a competitive market that is free from government corruption.
The lack of government transparency that has occurred from Qatar and the UAE is
troublesome to say the least for the likes of Delta Air Lines, American Airlines, and United
Airlines. The big three viewed the destabilizing of the airline industry in the U.S. market
happening, putting those airlines at risk for a financial crisis. However, with no clear language on
a subsidy defined in an open-skies agreement, did Qatar and the UAE simply take advantage of
what was provided to them and ignore the standard that the World Trade Organization goes by?
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Either way U.S. carriers saw a significant substantial loss from Middle East-U.S. routes and
sounded the alarm that this would be happening throughout profitable European routes if
something was not done to help settle the problem (Open and Fair Skies, 2019).
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
When researching an airline to choose to fly, no matter if it is a United States carrier or
not, the bottom line is that consumers look first and foremost at price. This is because most of the
population around the world would prefer to get to the same exact location for a cheaper price
than spend money on a “brand” (Bhagat, 2018).
A handful of individuals, however, will purchase tickets based upon the name of an
airline and only fly that airline. This is primarily because of perks and rewards that many airlines
offer, such as frequent flyer miles, or bonus miles earned when signing up for the carrier
sponsored credit card. Perks for airlines do this to keep customers engaged with the brand, while
also offering superior service to amenities such as airline sky clubs or upgrades on available
seating (Dastin, 2015).
This study examined the correlation between a fair and competitive market, i.e. Open
Skies agreements, and the direct impact that they have on the U.S. carriers and U.S. jobs. The
research also examines whether abiding by Open Skies agreements helps consumers keep costs
low, i.e. ticket prices, and if this benefits U.S. carriers and other participating airlines. This
chapter discusses the study population, sample, research design, validation and limitations, and
confidentiality.
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Population
The population examined in this study was based primarily upon ticketed passengers who
traveled internationally on the big three U.S. airlines—American Airlines, Delta Air Lines, and
United Airlines—between 2014 and 2016. The specifics (such as business travel, first class, etc)
of each airline and the number of ticketed passengers per airline were not included because the
study is based on three airlines collectively, not individually. This is because this topic was a
joint complaint that was brought about between Delta Air Lines, American Airlines, and United
Airlines. In addition, there is no data that is connected to any regional/domestic-based carrier
primarily for the focus of international travel and the ticketed passengers that were on those
flights.
Sample
The study gathered information from the four busiest airports in Europe that had the most
international travel between those airports and the United States, including: London Heathrow
Airport in the United Kingdom, Paris Charles de Gaulle Airport in France, Amsterdam Airport
Schiphol in the Netherlands, and Frankfurt Airport in Germany. The study included research
relative to international flights from those four airports into the United States. It did not take into
consideration other international travel to destinations outside of the United States. In addition,
this investigation did not look at international travel from the United States to these four
European airports. The primary reason for not looking into international travel from the United
States to those four European Airports was that obtaining that information was not readily
available.
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Study Design
This research included information based on the U.S. International Air Passenger and
Freight Statistics report for the years 2014 through 2016 (transportation.gov, 2018). The study
took the numbers from 2014, 2015, and 2016. The study does not include surveys or numbers
gathered by the researcher, but instead gathered information that was provided and verified by
the United States Transportation Department. This is because all information is public data that
can be located on the United States Transportation Department website, and the study was not
based on surveys, as research for the purpose of this study did not require it.
Data Collection
The data that was collected for this study was obtained from the United States
Transportation Department website for the 2014-2016 years that were studied
(transportation.gov, 2018). The data was collected from Table 7 in the Appendices and placed
into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. It was then categorized by the year the data was taken from
and the airport where the data came from. After the data was categorized it was then analyzed.
The data that was used throughout this investigation are included in the Appendices section of
this study (See Appendix A, B, and C).
Data Analysis
Data analysis was completed using Microsoft Excel and SPSS Statistics 24 software. The
research shows the correlation between international passenger travel from the four major
European airports and their impact on how many jobs they supported in the United States. The
data was manipulated by taking away a percentage of those passengers traveling from the four
major European airports because of the hypothetical route closures that would happen if Open
Skies were not agreed upon by Qatar and the UAE. This reflects an estimation on consumer
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prices as well as if routes were closed. The data that was studied addressed the following
research questions:
1. Do Open Skies agreements have a positive correlation for the U.S. jobs?
2. Do Open Skies agreements provide consumer lower prices?
3. How were the countries of Qatar and the UAE hurting U.S. carriers, i.e. jeopardizing
jobs?
Validation and Limitations
The data that was collected was obtained from the United States Transportation
Department (transportation.gov, 2018). This information was validated by the United States
government but was also studied by the researcher who contacted the Transportation Department
to verify numbers that were made available to the public (Jason Horner, Office of Aviation
Analysis at the U.S. Department of Transportation, personal communication, 3/13/19). The
research was conducted but included limitations because of the data that was collected and
analyzed.
First, a limitation that must be pointed out is that the data collected was not studied in a
manner to gather the number of passengers per individual airline, but rather looked at the overall
number of international passengers for the three major airlines (Delta, American, and United
airlines) combined. This is a limitation because data was not readily available for each separate
airline, so the author could not examine if the airlines were all affected equally with international
travel.
A second limitation is that according to the IATA regarding international flights, 40
percent is the average number of people or threshold using the airline service for travel/tourism
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into the United States (iata.org, 2019). Since the study is only looking at U.S. carriers, this
number will be based off the 40 percent which is a limitation.
A third limitation is that the data from four select airports was used in this study: London
Heathrow Airport in the United Kingdom, Paris Charles de Gaulle Airport in France, Amsterdam
Airport Schiphol in the Netherlands, and Frankfurt Airport in Germany. These airports were
chosen because they are the four busiest airports in Europe. The data analyzed excludes all other
European airports and does not take into consideration international travel from other continents.
This limitation is due to the author choosing these four airports.
The fourth limitation is that this study does not take into consideration U.S. international
travel into those four select European airports. The study was conducted looking at a one-way
effect of the Open Skies agreement.
Confidentiality
No human subjects were used in this research, so there were no foreseeable risks to
anyone. All data collected was publicly available through the United States Transportation
Department, and passenger data is not distinguishable by person or airline in this study.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
Airport Numbers
The data collected for this study was obtained for the years 2014, 2015, and 2016. It
includes only international travel from the four busiest airports in Europe to the United States.
These years were chosen because that is when the threat level of route closures were brought to
the attention of the general public by Delta Air Lines, American Airlines, and United Airlines.
Table 1 displays the data that was collected and analyzed:
As the data shows, the U.S. market share in Europe’s four busiest airports is significant.
In 2014, the LHR (London Heathrow) U.S. market share was 38 percent. That means 38 percent
of all international travel to the United States from LHR was on one of American Airlines, Delta
Air Lines, or United Airlines. The market share started to decrease though in the following years
to 37 percent in 2015, and 36 percent in 2016 ending the year with 5,217,451 passengers
(transportation.gov, 2018).
In 2014, CDG (Paris Charles de Gaulle Airport) had a 44 percent U.S. market share
ending the year with 2,776,103 passengers traveling to the United States. In 2015 the market
share for CDG was 43 percent, and in 2016 the market share again was 43 percent ending the
year with 2,873,756 passengers traveling to the United States (transportation.gov, 2018).
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Table 1. International Passenger Travel from Four Busiest EU Airports to U.S. in 2014, 2015,
and 2016.
Airport

2014

2015

2016

14,180,870

14,578,818

14,492,920

6,309,326

6,767,269

6,683,153

6,487,042

6,588,983

6,599,157

4,685,322

4,862,947

4,907,222

5,388,730

5,394,163

5,217,451

2,776,103

2,909,926

2,873,756

2,140,724

2,042,585

1,913,755

2,904,900

3,112,286

3,140,622

Market Total
London-Heathrow
(LHR)
Charles de Gaulle-Paris
(CDG)
Frankfurt-Germany
(FRA)
Amsterdam-Schiphol
(AMS)
London-Heathrow
(LHR)
Charles de Gaulle-Paris
(CDG)
Frankfurt-Germany
(FRA)
Amsterdam-Schiphol
(AMS)

U.S. Market Share

Source: transportation.gov, 2018

Data for FRA (Frankfurt Airport) is comparable to the first two airports in terms of
market share. In 2014, FRA had a 33 percent U.S. market share of international traveling coming
to the United States with 2,140,724 passengers. The market share fell to 31 percent in 2015, and
in 2016 the U.S. market share was 29 percent with 1,913,755 passengers traveling to the United
States on a U.S. carrier (transportation.gov, 2018).
Finally, the U.S. market share in AMS (Amsterdam Airport Schiphol) for 2014 was 62
percent, meaning that 2,904,900 passengers traveled to the United States using one of the three
U.S. carriers involved. Unlike any of the other airports though, AMS gained U.S. market share in
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2015 at 64 percent, and in 2016 at year end was again at 64 percent with 3,140,622 passengers
traveling internationally to the United States.
Table 2 below breaks down the four select European airports using that 40 percent
threshold to reflect the percentage of travel/tourism passengers from those airports into the
United States for 2016.
Table 2. Breakdown of Four Major EU Airports Using the 40% Threshold to Reflect Passenger
Travel/Tourism to U.S. in 2016.
Airport

LHR
CDG
FRA
AMS

Passengers (2016)

Threshold

Travel/Tourism Passengers

5,217,451
2,873,756
1,913,755
3,140,622

40%
40%
40%
40%

2,086,980
1,149,502
765,502
1,256,249

Breaking down the amount of travel that comes into the United States for tourism, as
Table 2 shows, is a significant number of passengers whom help support the economy. From
these four select European airports alone—albeit the four busiest airports in Europe—a total of
5,258,233 passengers traveled into the United States for the sole purpose of tourism in the year
2016.
According to the International Trade Administration Industry and Analysis for National
Travel and Tourism office (2019), a total of 75.9 million people traveled to the United States for
tourism and travel in 2016. This attributed to 7.6 million jobs, of which 5.3 million were direct
and 2.3 million were indirect (travel.trade.gov, 2019). This additionally attributed to 1.2 million
jobs that were supported by tourism exports (travel.trade.gov, 2019).
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Referring back to the IATA statistic regarding international flights, 40 percent is the
average number of people or threshold using the airline service for travel/tourism into the United
States (iata.org, 2019), from the four busiest airports that were in use in Europe, the number of
international passengers using a U.S. carrier to travel to the United States in 2016 was 5,258,233
passengers. Taking 5,258,233 and dividing that number by the 75.9 million people whom
traveled to the U.S. in 2016, the four busiest European airports contributed almost 7 percent
(actual percentage is 6.927 percent) of the international travel to the United States on U.S.
carriers alone (iata.org, 2019).
Table 3 lists each of the four select European airports and the number of passengers
contributing to jobs in the United States using the data provided by IATA (iata.org, 2019) and
calculated by the researcher. The international traveler’s percentage was calculated by dividing
the number of international passengers traveling to the United States by 75.9 million, which
reflects the total number of people who traveled to the United States in 2016 (iata.org, 2019).
The resulting percentage was then multiplied by 7.6 million jobs, of which 5.3 million were
direct and 2.3 million were indirect (travel.trade.gov, 2019), to determine the number of jobs
each of the airports was responsible for in the United States.
Table 3. List of Passengers, International Travelers, and Total Jobs each of the EU Airports was
Responsible for in the U.S. in 2016.
Airport
LHR
CDG
FRA
AMS

Passengers (2016)

% Int'l Travelers

Total Jobs

2,086,980
1,149,502
765,502
1,256,249

2.749%
1.514%
1.008%
1.655%

208,924
115,064
76,608
125,780
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The four busiest European airports contributed a significant amount of international
passenger travel into the United States from Europe, regardless of the fact that it does not include
all passenger travel. In this study only passenger travel via Delta Air Lines, American Airlines
and United Airlines was investigated for the primary purpose of tourism within the United
States. The data reveals that international travel through the four select European airports did
provide a substantial number of jobs to the United States, with the London Heathrow airport
leading the way. Given the combined four select European airports accounted for more than onehalf million jobs either directly or indirectly (once again referring to directly as hotel jobs and
restaurants, and indirectly being cleaning staff and maintenance etc) the three major U.S. carriers
had a right to be concerned about a threat to their routes in Europe from the Middle East/Gulf
carriers.
Gulf Carriers Impact
Since the beginning of 2018, Delta Air Lines focused a majority of their flying towards
the transatlantic market, specifically Europe. It helped the company improve its passenger
revenue per available seat mile (TRASM). During the third quarter of 2018 Delta Air Lines
TRASM improved 4.3 percent year-over-year to 16.25 cents from 15.58 cents in 2017 (Bhagat,
2018). American Airlines TRASM had a 1.8 percent growth, and United Air Lines 6.1% growth
was the highest in the U.S. airline industry (Bhagat, 2018).
A 2015 Bloomberg article titled “U.S. Airlines Vs. Gulf Carriers: What Open Skies
Battle Means for Consumers” stated that Gulf carriers more than tripled their share of U.S. to
India bookings and U.S. to Southeast Asia bookings since 2008 from 12 percent to 40 percent.
The U.S. carriers’ shares, however, fell from 39 percent to 34 percent (Clampet, 2015). It is the
author’s opinion, based on the data in the aforementioned article, that the Gulf carriers clearly
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impacted the U.S. airlines’ market share in both India and Southeast Asia as well as taking a
substantial amount of their revenue from these areas.
In the tables to follow, the projected numbers provided by Delta Air Lines, American
Airlines, and United Airlines are reflected through a group calling for Fair and Open Skies,
which show the eventual causation of what the Gulf carriers were doing and what would have
happened if no one intervened. It was estimated that “every time a U.S. airline ceded a route to a
heavily-subsidized Gulf carrier, 1,500 American jobs are lost” (enotrans.org, 2017, page 1).”
Since it seems for the time being that the controversy with the Gulf carriers has been
reconciled, the numbers to follow are hypothetical and roughly based on what could have
happened in the future with the Gulf carriers’ unfair advantage. In addition, they take into
account a conservative approach to the four European airports this study is using and how it
would affect daily international traffic into the United States, therefore affecting the number of
jobs that these airlines support.
It is difficult to predict what could have happened if the Gulf carriers were to expand and
abuse their fifth freedom rights into the four busiest European airports that travel to the United
States. However, it is safe to assume that since travel to the United States is profitable, that this
was always a goal for these emerging carriers. This was demonstrated especially by Qatar
Airways in 2015 when it bought a 10 percent stake in the company International Airlines Group
(IAG), which owns both British Airways and the Spanish carrier Iberia (Mutzabaugh, 2015).
This Qatar Airways strategy helped them in the ultra-competitive London marketplace, where
London Heathrow is located, to expand business ties not only to Europe, but to the United States.
According to the data, (Clampet, 2015), 5 percent of the U.S. carriers’ market share was
lost in India and Southeast Asia from 2008 to 2013 because of the Gulf carriers’ unfair
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competition. Although it is difficult to predict, the study will show a hypothetical what could
happen if there was a moderate share loss or an extreme share loss (5 percent) in the four major
European airports using the year 2016.
Table 4 represents what would happen using 2016 numbers if 2 percent of the U.S.
market share was taken away by the emerging Gulf carriers. This represents a more conservative
approach in numbers compared to the 5 percent hypothetical loss in the four major European
Airports, to show how even a small loss would be substantial.
Table 4. Numbers Reveal What Would Happen in 2016 if 2 Percent of the U.S. Passenger Market
Share was Taken Away by Gulf Carriers at 4 Major EU Airports.
Airport

LHR
CDG
FRA
AMS

Passengers (2016)

2% Share Number

New 40% Threshold Number

5,217,451
2,873,756
1,913,755
3,140,622

5,113,102
2,816,281
1,875,480
3,077,810

2,045,241
1,126,512
750,192
1,231,124

Table 5 represents the number of jobs impacted by a hypothetical market loss. If you
divide the 75.9 million passengers traveling to the United States in 2016 (once again referring
back to the numbers the International Trade Administration Industry and Analysis for National
Travel and Tourism office presented) by a 2 percent market loss in each airport, and then
multiply that percentage by 7.6 million, you will see the difference between the number of jobs
that have been affected by this hypothetical market loss. The exact same method was used
reflecting a 5 percent market loss in those areas on the remaining tables to represent an extreme
expansion by the Gulf carriers into the areas.
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Table 5. Passenger to Job Calculations if 2 Percent of the U.S. Passenger Market Share was
Taken Away by Gulf Carriers at 4 Major EU Airports.
Airport

LHR
CDG
FRA
AMS

Passengers (2016)

% Int'l Travelers

Total Jobs

2,045,241
1,126,512
750,192
1,231,124

2.69%
1.48%
0.98%
1.62%

204,440
112,480
74,480
123,120

Table 6 shows the hypothetical difference between actual 2016 numbers (from Table 3)
and the hypothetical numbers of a 2 percent market loss in the 4 European airports by the U.S.
carriers (from Table 5). Looking at the breakdown of jobs by airport in 2016, and then
calculating the 2 percent loss the net difference shows a significant loss in the jobs that the
airports support. Overall the loss of jobs is close to 12,000 (actual number 11,856).
Table 6. Job Loss Projections if 2 Percent of U.S. Passenger Market Share Was Taken Away by
Gulf Carriers at 4 Major EU Airports.
Airport

LHR
CDG
FRA
AMS

U.S. Jobs Created (2016)

2% loss

Net Difference

208,924
115,064
76,608
125,780

204,440
112,480
74,480
123,120

4,484
2,584
2,128
2,660

Table 7 represents what would happen using 2016 numbers if a more drastic percentage
of 5 percent was used and what that would look like to U.S. jobs if that were to happen. The
reason 5 percent is being used is this was the total loss in market share that occurred in India and
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Southeast Asia, so applying that drastic downturn seemed like an appropriate approach to use for
the four busiest European airports (Subtract 5 percent from 2016 Passengers. Multiply that new
number by 40 percent. This gives you the “New 40% Threshold Number”).
Table 7. Numbers Reveal What Would Happen in 2016 if 5 Percent of the U.S. Passenger
Market Share was Taken Away by Gulf Carriers at 4 Major EU Airports.
Airport

LHR
CDG
FRA
AMS

Passengers (2016)

5% Share Number

New 40% Threshold Number

5,217,451
2,873,756
1,913,755
3,140,622

4,956,578
2,730,068
1,818,067
2,983,591

1,982,631
1,092,027
727,227
1,193,436

Table 8 was compiled keeping the 75.9 million passengers traveling to the United States
from the 4 major European airports and dividing the new number of passengers in 2016 based on
a hypothetical 5 percent market loss in each airport by 75.9 million. Next, multiplying that
percentage by 7.6 million, we should see the difference between the number of jobs that would
have been affected by this hypothetical market loss (Example LHR:
1,982,631/75,900,000=2.61%*7,600,000=198,360)
Table 9 shows the net difference of jobs if a hypothetical 5 percent market loss occurred
at these 4 major European airports and took away business from the U.S. carriers (The
percentage of the international travelers is split up from market perspective to ~7.)
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Table 8. Passenger to Job Calculations if 5 Percent of the U.S. Passenger Market Share was
Taken Away by Gulf Carriers at 4 Major EU Airports.
Airport
LHR
CDG
FRA
AMS

Passengers (2016)

% Int'l Travelers

Total Jobs

1,982,631
1,092,027
727,227
1,193,436

2.61%
1.43%
0.96%
1.57%

198,360
108,680
72,960
119,320

Table 9. Job Loss Projections if 5 Percent of U.S. Passenger Market Share was Taken Away by
Gulf Carriers at 4 Major EU Airports.
Airport
LHR
CDG
FRA
AMS

U.S. Jobs Created (2016)

5% loss

Net Difference

208,924
115,064
76,608
125,780

198,360
108,680
72,960
119,320

10,564
6,384
3,648
6,460

A more significant number of U.S. jobs would be affected if a 5 percent market loss
occurred at these airports and most likely worst-case scenario. However, it does show the
importance of these airports and what they provide to U.S. carriers. The data from Table 9 (if
you add up the red numbers in the Net Difference column) shows that 27,056 jobs would be
affected; it would hit the U.S. economy hard if this were to happen.
Ticket Price
Ticket price is another factor U.S. carriers worried about in relation to the Gulf carriers.
When these Gulf carriers seat dump and offer lower ticket prices—because they will still be able
to fly with little incurred loss given their governments subsidization—this affects the U.S.
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carriers ability to offer competitive ticket prices. Instead of the U.S. carriers offering lower prices
to make up for the loss of seated passengers on their airlines, airfare would have to be increased
to make a profit. This does not benefit the airline or the consumer. Despite the popular belief that
this would help consumer pricing, it actually drastically hurts it.
Ticket prices from Europe to the United States typically are dependent upon where a
person is going.
For this study an average was used between all of the airports in Europe because most of
the prices were similar. According to the 2018 Holiday Travel Index, the media.hopper.com
website uses the lowest end of the scale at $800 and the high end of the scale was $1120 (Surry,
2018). The average price used in this study to determine the cost of a ticket for passengers
traveling to the United States from Europe was $960.
Table 10 below shows the net difference of jobs lost with a 2 percent market share loss
for U.S. carriers in the 4 major European airports for the year 2016. This is the hypothetical
amount of money lost and the amount a ticket would have to be increased to on average in order
to make up for the loss of passengers.
Table 10. Numbers Reveal What Would Happen in 2016 if 2 Percent U.S. Market Share was
Taken Away by Gulf Carriers at 4 Major EU Airports.
Airport

LHR
CDG
FRA
AMS

Passengers via T/T (2016)

2% loss

Net Difference
in Passengers

Total Loss ($)

2,086,980
1,149,502
765,502
1,256,249

2,045,241
1,126,512
750,192
1,231,124

41,739
22,990
15,310
25,125

40,069,440
22,070,400
14,697,600
24,120,000
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As Table 10 shows, multiplying the difference in a loss of a 2 percent U.S. market share
from each of the 4 airports by the average ticket price of $960 reflects a catastrophic amount of
money that would be lost by Delta Air Lines, American Airlines, and United Airlines. Most
notably is the loss from London Heathrow airport, which reflects nearly double of every other
European airport in this study with over $40,000,000 in losses. With all airports combined, the
loss would be $100,957,440. This is a significant loss to U.S. carriers and would impact the way
tickets would be priced.
Table 11 reflects a feasible way to make up the loss difference, however keep in mind
this is not all encompassing because other rates and fees would probably be applied. In addition,
recall that this is just an average. Prices would likely vary from one airport to the next depending
upon the number of passengers each airport flies over a year, or in peak months throughout the
year.
Table 11. 2016 New Ticket Price Based on 2 Percent U.S. Market Share Loss.

Airport

Ticket Rev ($)

2% loss ($)

Total Loss ($)

New Price ($)

LHR
CDG
FRA
AMS

2,003,500,800
1,103,521,920
734,881,920
1,205,999,040

2,045,241
1,126,512
750,192
1,231,124

40,069,440
22,070,400
14,697,600
24,120,000

979.59
979.59
979.59
979.59

The ticket cost was determined by multiplying the number of passengers that were flying
in 2016 by the average ticket price of $960. Then, taking the revenue that was generated and
dividing it by the 2% hypothetical market loss of passengers that were diverted to the Gulf
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carriers and that is the new average ticket price for the four major European Airports. The total
loss is shown as a reminder of how much total revenue is generated by the passengers at each
airport and how it would affect Delta Air Lines, American Airlines, and United Airlines in
monetary terms.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
This study explored the benefits of having Open Skies agreements, not only for the
United States economy, but also for consumers, i.e. ticket pricing, when flying with Delta Air
Lines, American Airlines, and United Airlines. This chapter provides a discussion of the study
results and recommendations for further research relative to Open Skies agreements.
In January 2015 Delta Air Lines, American Airlines, and United Airlines raised concerns
and released joint findings that the Gulf carriers of Qatar Airways, Etihad Airways, and Emirates
Airlines were deliberately violating the Open Skies agreements that were set in place with the
nations of Qatar and the UAE (See Figures 1, 2, 3). The U.S. carriers claimed that the Gulf
carriers were receiving unfair subsidies from their governments in upwards of $52 billion
(Burnley, 2017). The problem? The actions used by Qatar, Etihad, and Emirates and their unfair
practices not only threatened the U.S. airline industry, but directly threatened millions of jobs
and $1.5 trillion in economic activity that the U.S. airlines, especially the big three—Delta Air
Lines, American Airlines, and United Airlines—support daily.
Results
The results came from examining the four busiest airports in Europe for international
passengers traveling into the United States on one of three major carriers— Delta Air Lines,
American Airlines, and United Airlines. The results varied in some aspects because it is difficult
to predict accurately how much the Gulf carriers could or would impact the U.S. economy.
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However, basing the information off of the India and Southeast Asia market share of 5 percent,
there is significant concern that, an amount similar to 5 percent or greater would cause a major
disturbance in the U.S. economy relative to jobs. Referring to Tables 8 and 9 in the previous
chapter shows that a 5 percent market loss at the four busiest European airports would
hypothetically result in more than 27,000 jobs lost in the United States. Once again, this is based
on the big three airlines not taking into account how this would affect domestic airlines, which it
almost certainly would.
Another important result from this study was the amount of money that would be lost by
the U.S. carriers with a 2 percent loss of market share, as shown in Table 10 in the previous
chapter. This is significant because even a 2 percent loss of market share for these 3 major
carriers would result in a total loss of $100,957,440 annually, using an average and fairly
conservative ticket price of $960. This does not take into account first class cabin or business
class. In addition, it does not take into account purchases that are made on transatlantic flights,
such as meals and drinks. The assessment of this hypothetical risk was at the low end and did not
take into account what happened to the market share in India and Southeast Asia, which would
have been even more significant if looked at.
Limitations
One of the limitations of this study was the change in ticket prices. The least significant
result that was discovered was a ticket price increase from $960 to $979.59 only making the
average $19.59 more than the original average ticket cost of $960. Streamlining the $960 across
all of the carriers was probably not the best way to determine what would actually happen to
consumers when it came to actual ticket price inflation that could occur for U.S. carriers losing
market share. Ticket prices not only would be more significant if additional time was devoted to
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determining market share loss, but it would also hurt other U.S. domestic airlines in terms of
how they would price their tickets. As discussed earlier in this study in the United States most of
the flag carriers still operate using a hub-and-spoke network, which means transferring
passengers from international flights to domestic flights and vice versa. Delta Air Lines,
American Airlines, and United Airlines are worried that they will have to reduce international
flight frequencies, which in turn reduces the demand for domestic services as well because the
Gulf carriers are being able to operate with a seemingly endless amount of backing through
subsidies by their respective governments. This would be domestic route closures, and higher
ticket prices in order to serve some areas throughout the United States.
Unfortunately, not being able to break down ticket prices by class or airline also had a
lesser effect in determining how much ticket prices would rise in a hypothetical loss of market
share. Streamlining the $960 over all the carriers was the easiest way to show an impact of a 2
percent market share loss in this study. Many airlines pride themselves on their superior cabin
status, such as first class. Many consumers utilize the option of upgrades for transatlantic flights,
especially for tourism. Not being able to break this down and distinguish the amount of money
that could be lost over upgrades is a limitation to this study.
The fact that this study did not separate airlines and grouped the big three together was
also a limitation. Many airlines offer different travel prices based on if they have a “hub” in
Europe that they utilize. Take for example Delta Air Lines, which utilizes the Amsterdam
Airport Schiphol. Many flights for Delta Air Lines that are leaving Europe depart from AMS
because this is efficient for Delta Air Lines. Prices for passengers departing from AMS are
typically more expensive than a direct flight from LHR because this is what works for Delta Air
Lines. So, a 2 percent market loss overall could hit a hub like AMS as a 10 to 12 percent market
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loss in that area. This would be a significant impact to a company like Delta Air Lines that
utilizes Amsterdam Airport Schiphol as their main base of European operations. Not being able
to study this aspect further and in depth based on a company and where they do the majority of
their flying from in Europe, is a limitation when it comes to accurately showing projected
numbers.
Future Studies
This research was accomplished to understand how Open Skies agreements play a
financial role not only for U.S. carriers—Delta Air Lines, American Airlines, and United
Airlines—but also for the U.S. economy in terms of jobs. More research can be done,
specifically on how each of the three major airlines could be affected by Gulf carriers who
violate Open Skies agreements.
Another area of research that could be studied is the overall impact on the domestic
carriers in the United States. It would be significant to discover how they would be impacted
financially since those carriers also support numerous jobs in the United States.
Another interesting area that could be researched is the overall impact the Gulf carriers
could have throughout Europe and possibly other areas in the world where they are not yet
present. The study that was conducted for this thesis only looked at the top four busiest airports
in Europe—London Heathrow Airport -United Kingdom, Paris Charles de Gaulle AirportFrance, Amsterdam Airport Schiphol-Netherlands, and Frankfurt Airport-Germany. This study
did not take into account other European airports that many U.S. carriers fly into or have
codeshare partners with. This could present a significant amount of data as far as number of jobs
and loss of revenue if another study was conducted to show all of Europe being affected by the
Gulf carriers and their handling of the Open Skies agreement.
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Another important aspect to investigate would be taking the information that is known
and applying it to areas such as Asia and India. Many of the U.S. carriers do a lot of business in
places like Japan, China, and India. Referring back in this study to the 5 percent market loss that
has already occurred in India and Southeast Asia (Clampet, 2015) and expanding a hypothetical
loss to areas like China and Japan could drastically impact jobs and revenue to huge areas of
operation for U.S. carriers, thus hurting U.S. jobs even more.
Finally, another area of research that may be interesting to examine is the travel/tourism
coming out of the United States and going to places such as Europe. If the Gulf carriers were
able to fly out of the United States and into European airports or possibly even smaller airports
such as what Emirate’s is doing with Milan to JFK, but vice versa, how big of a market hit would
these U.S. carriers take? It is possible that this could be a threat to the future of U.S. carriers and
the United States economy.
Conclusion
Over the past few years Delta Air Lines, American Airlines, and United Airlines have
asked the U.S. federal government for help in controlling the unfair advantage that Gulf carriers
are leveraging, even though they had signed an Open Skies Agreement with the United States.
In May 2018, the Trump administration came to an agreement with Qatar and United Arab
Emirates that will protect thousands of American jobs and help enforce U.S. trade deals against
unfair foreign practices by the Gulf carriers and their governments (Bachman, 2019).
However, there has already been whistleblowing by the big three U.S. carriers that Qatar
and the UAE have already violated the agreement that they signed in 2018. To make matters
worse, President Donald Trump told U.S. airlines battling Qatar Airways to take the dispute to
regulators, dashing their hopes that he would champion their cause and potentially alter Open
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Skies agreements with Qatar (Bachman and Wadhams, 2019). It is largely expected that the
process of going through the Department of Transportation complaint process would not meet
the legal standard of a case worth pursuing. Hence the fact that Delta Air Lines, American
Airlines, and United Airlines have resisted pursuing that route since raising the complaints nearly
five years ago (Leff, 2019).
The change of heart, or the lack of concern, now coming from the Trump Administration
about holding the UAE and especially Qatar accountable is troublesome for these U.S. carriers
(Stewart, 2017). This suggests an image to many other countries “that they, too, are free to
exploit American workers (Holland, 2019).” Once again, this type of behavior being disregarded
is putting thousands of American jobs at risk. If this continues to be allowed there could be
irreparable consequences down the road for all U.S. carriers.
This research was conducted with the intent to understand the impact of breaking Open
Skies agreements with the United States by the Gulf carriers, and how this would affect the U.S.
economy surrounding jobs and those U.S. based carriers. The research has shown the benefit for
following Open Skies agreements, not only for the sake of the United States, but globally as
well. Open Skies agreements help keep ticket prices low, and although the average change
conducted in this study only showed about a $20 increase for fares, it would be far greater if it
actually happened because of the number of carriers that fly globally. Open Skies agreements are
in place for the consumer. If airlines, especially Gulf carriers, are not going to abide by them,
then they should be reprimanded considering they are an extension of their national government.
Thousands of U.S. jobs will continue to be at stake if Open Skies agreements are
violated, not to mention the amount it will cost passengers to travel internationally. In addition,
the many routes that Delta Air Lines, American Airlines, and United Airlines fly could be
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subject to termination because they are not sustainable when competing with the governmentsubsidized Gulf-based airlines.
This research investigated the data collected and took a minimalist approach because it is
difficult to predict the impact of Gulf carriers and what they would do to disrupt the U.S. carriers
and in turn the U.S. economy. The best that anyone can do is take the data that is present from
Southeast Asia and look what has occurred there for market share loss, and then try to apply it to
other regions to capture a glimpse of what could happen if nothing is done to prevent it.
This research looked at the four busiest airports in Europe with passengers traveling to
the United States. This study did not research U.S. passengers traveling to Europe on these U.S.
carriers or passengers traveling into the United States from other European airports, or from
other parts of the world. If that data was studied, the amount of revenue that could be lost and the
number of jobs that could be lost globally may be staggering.
The data from this study clearly shows that any market share loss would in turn affect
numerous jobs in the United States. It would hurt the U.S. carriers and possibly put U.S.
regionals at risk from route closures. Although there is no definitive number that this study can
point to, the significance of Open Skies agreements is in place to prevent occurrences like the
one in Southeast Asia from happening.
However, although the study shows that market loss to the U.S. carriers would produce
job losses throughout the United States, and possibly route closures and higher ticket costs. It is
important to note, (as earlier in the study) the topic of a subsidy was never addressed in the openskies agreement. Even though most countries follow the WTO rules and definitions of what a
subsidy is, these technically are used as a guideline to abide by. To prevent further accusations in
the future of open-skies, it is the author’s opinion that agreements between multiple countries lay
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out what the definition of a subsidy is (what is acceptable and what is not). This would avoid
future conflict between nations and hopefully prevent unfair practice in terms of an agreement
like Delta Air Lines, American Airlines, and United Airlines have claimed that the Gulf carriers
used to their advantage with the United States.
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